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OF DUNCAN, PETER, AND THOMAS KUHN
John Henry Schlegel*
It would be a lie to say that I have always enjoyed Duncan's
company. His private persona is a delight. An afternoon spent in
my kitchen remains particularly memorable, as well as a brief
interchange at the second Boston critical legal studies ("cls")
conference and an incredibly kind intervention that helped to
facilitate my being at the University of Miami Law School
conference. However, from the beginning I have had trouble with
Duncan's public persona-that of the missionary.' I really don't
like missionaries, something that must come from growing up in
the very liberal edge of American Protestantism. So, when faced
with Duncan's public persona, I have always been torn between
dislike of the show and the expectation that if I listen carefully, I
will learn something.2
Why tell you these things, other than to insist again on the
importance of the personal in intellectual history? Simply this:
since the beginning, Duncan has chosen to work within a
framework that can be readily understood by what he has taken to
be his target audience of unbelievers. Thus, starting with his early
piece on legal formalism,3 his has been an internal critique.'
Another example of this approach, albeit a very good one, is A
Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siecle5 ("Critique").
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Laura suggested that I
make some necessary explanations.
1 I am not the only one to make this observation. In A Discussion of Critical Legal
Studies Paul Bator said, "It's Duncan as a recruiting agency that's the problem, not
Duncan as a professor." HARVARD SOCIETY FOR LAW & PUBLIC POLICY & THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW & PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, A DISCUSSION OF
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 32 (1985). I am also inured to snide remarks about the
company that I can be associated with.
2 You will have to ask Duncan what he thinks of my company and public persona. All
I know is that he was not pleased with my stance as an outsider objecting to the
reproduction of hierarchy within our little crew. See Duncan Kennedy, Psycho-Social
CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1013, 1016 (1985).
3 See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973).
4 An internal critique is one made from within the premises of the system under
examination. External critique is made from some point outside the system; historical or
sociological or economic standpoints come easily to mind.




Now, Duncan surely believes that proceeding by means of
internal critique is the most plausible plan for making converts. I
do not disagree. But, at the same time, I am convinced that his
choice to approach the job of transforming an intellectual field as
would a particular kind of missionary, through the world view of
the intended convert-a demonstration of faith-rather than
through the provision of health care, education, or other good
works-a demonstration by witness-was and remains a mistake,
though a mistake made not by Duncan alone and a closer call than
I will make it out to be.
The choice to proceed by means of internal critique, to make
sure that the audience could understand the message, meant that
the best result that we in cls could hope for from our efforts was
the marginalization by inclusion, and therefore clear
subordination, that any dominant mode of thought can graciously
offer to its worthy adversaries. Thus, I believe that my unease
with Duncan's public persona is not only a snippet of my
biography, but also a reflection of what seems to me to be a
deficiency in his thought, apparent in the book we here celebrate
by taking seriously.
In an effort to isolate and explain this deficiency, I wish first
to go back to an old standby, Thomas Kuhn's book, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions.6 In the mid-1970s, when I broke into this
racket, everyone was reading Kuhn. The world was awash in
"paradigm shifts,' ''new paradigms," and sententious utterances
designed to be "paradigmatic." For me, the most curious thing
about Kuhn's work was the mechanism he used in his story to
explain how paradigm shifts took place.
As Kuhn told the story, the "normal science" of puzzle solving
accumulates "anomalies" that are systematically interpreted as
consistent with the "dominant paradigm"-observation of this
action of inclusion is apparently one of the ways to determine
empirically what is the dominant paradigm-or are simply ignored,
swept under the rug. Then, all of a sudden, for no generalizable
reason, practitioners in the field begin to take these anomalies
seriously and a sense of crisis ensues. Out of this crisis comes a
period of "extraordinary science" during which the crisis is
resolved, either by modestly reconceptualizing the existing
paradigm or by adopting a new paradigm that explains the
anomalous findings. More importantly, this crisis provides a new
set of puzzles to which a reestablished "normal science" might
pursue answers. Once established, this new paradigm will
6 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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systematically interpret some findings as consistent that its
adoption has rendered anomalous or will sweep these findings
under the rug. But, never fear, that is how science works: a
paradigm always directs inquiry in such a way as to make some
things intelligible-and so showcased as examples of the progress
of science-and others unintelligible-and so ignored.7
While Kuhn was routinely criticized for "glorifying
subjectivity and even irrationality,"8 as well as for offering a
"relativistic"9 understanding of science, the brouhaha over his
book seemed to ignore one significant aspect of his tale. In his
depiction of the overwhelmingly rational actions of real scientists
who, like most workers, simply want some intellectual order in
their lives, he had introduced into science, not subjectivity or
irrationality, but magic.10 Try as Kuhn might to explain the
phenomena that he had so clearly described, there seemed to be
no way to identify beforehand the level of systemic disorder
necessary for a group of scientists to decide that a given collection
of anomalies brought their field into a state of crisis. Even worse,
there seemed to be no obvious way to predict why one or another
alternative paradigm would emerge victorious in the contest to
replace the rejected one. It was as if some scientist at a cocktail
party during an international conference got to yell first, "Crisis!"
and then, "Paradigm Shift!," as a result of which the field would be
significantly reordered and science would then proceed along its
merry way much as before. This would be the equivalent of
reenacting on some larger stage the teenage ritual saved for hot
summer nights where, at a stop light, one occupant of a car would
yell, "Chinese Fire Drill!" and all would empty the vehicle only to
thereafter change places in it and then proceed on much as before.
For me, this element of magic, along with Kuhn's notion that
differing paradigms were incommensurable, is one of the great
strengths of his description of scientific revolutions. Since it is not
argument that changes a dominant conception but magic, taken
together these two things suggest the futility of arguing against the
dominant conception of anything. Even if one sees a field or its
practices radically differently and understands that anomalies have
7 It is clear, though Kuhn does not emphasize it, that another possibility could follow
from this set of occurrences: a new discipline might be created to house the new paradigm
if a significant disagreement about the plausibility of the new paradigm arose among the
practitioners of the old one.
8 KUHN, supra note 6, at 186.
9 Id. at 205.
10 Roberto Unger, in another context, made it clear that a different way to think of this
question is as a matter of grace. I have resisted the urge to follow him because I quite
seriously doubt that lawyers are likely to be on the receiving end of grace.
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really proliferated in that field, saying so over and over is not going
to help. All one can do is either go forward in the way that one
believes work should go on under a new paradigm, i.e., provide
exemplars of good work under that new paradigm,11 or just "make
fun" and so "trash" work done under the dominant paradigm. In
my work I have tried both approaches 12 with admittedly limited
success 13 even within the cls flock. 14 And I still continue to do so. 5
Of course, limited success is what one should expect since magic
doesn't work every time.
11 Such, of course, is what Kuhn decided was the proper use of "paradigm" in his
elaboration of that concept in his 1969 postscript to the second edition of his little book.
That he consigned the rest of the content of that word to what he called "disciplinary
matrices" ought not stop us from continuing with his earlier usage. KUHN, supra note 6, at
181-91.
12 Which is not to say that I haven't made the "mistake" of arguing against the existing
paradigm from within it. However, sometimes the target is simply too tempting to pass up.
See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, A Tasty Tidbit, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1045 (1993); John Henry
Schlegel, Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers? Does Richard Posner Ever Sleep?
Writing About Jurisprudence, High Culture and the History of Intellectuals, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 277 (1997).
13 See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). This is my best attempt to do things as I would have them done
under some other paradigm. For other attempts at working this way that now seem less
successful to me, see John Henry Schlegel, A Certain Narcissism; A Slight Unseemliness, 63
COLO. L. REV. 595 (1992); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Theory and American
Legal Education: A Snake Swallowing Its Tail? in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN
AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 49 (Christian Joerges & David Trubek eds., 1989); David
Trubek & John Henry Schlegel, Charles E. Clark and the Reform of Legal Education, in
JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 81 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991).
For examples of trashing that seem to have gone better, see Alan Freeman & John
Henry Schlegel, Sex, Power and Silliness: An Essay on Ackerman's Reconstructing
American Law, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 847 (1985); John Henry Schlegel, Better than No
Teeth at All, 50 MD. L. REV. 231 (1991); John Henry Schlegel, Law and Endangered
Species: Is Survival Alone Cause for Celebration?, 28 IND. L. REV. 391 (1995); John Henry
H. Schlegel, Revenge, or Moon (Over) Your Law School, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 467 (1990).
14 Both John Henry Schlegel, The Relevance of Critical Legal Theory for the Teaching
of Civil Procedure (1981) (unpublished conference paper, on file with author) and John
Henry Schlegel, So You Want to Teach Critically, My Little Chickadee (1982)
(unpublished conference paper, on file with author) evoked not a yawn.
15 Of late I have begun to respond to the criticisms collectively called postmodernism
or antifoundationalism by writing history, in my case the history of the American economy
since World War II, in a mode that my colleague, Bert Westbrook, calls cinematagraphic.
If concentration on the foreground detail makes understanding impossible, as all becomes
trees, and concentration on the far background simply reproduces God's-Eye Grand
Theory, understanding might still possibly be had in the middle distance, as a horizon
might be seen from a passing train, should one be willing to approach one's subject with a
sufficient understanding of the fallibility of one's creations, a certain affection for one's
characters, and a certain ironic distance from the intentions of those characters. That such
an approach is without various existing disciplinary paradigms can be seen from the
criticisms I have received from those who work within them. Boiled down, their advice
reduces to, "You need to write more like they do in my field." That, of course, is what I
cannot do.
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Duncan seems to disagree with the conclusion that I have
drawn from Kuhn's book, assuming that he has ever considered it,
for this conclusion would suggest the ultimate futility of an internal
critique of liberal legalism of the kind that Duncan has always
pursued. This is not to say that his efforts have been for naught.
At times I have found examples of his critique unbelievably
breathtaking in the way that each clears away acres of underbrush
to reveal the crisp, regular outlines of whole areas of law. 6 Others,
I know, have had a similar experience. 7 Still, one can understand
more fully why I find the pursuit of internal critique to be a
deficiency in Duncan's thought by comparing his work on
adjudication with work by his good friend Peter Gabel. Peter's
work clearly points up both the strength and the weakness of the
attempt to transform an intellectual field, not even by means of
external critique, but from a position possibly describable as "aside
from," or maybe "outside of," "after," or "otherwise" than the
debate implied by the liberal legalist paradigm.
I would summarize Duncan's argument in Critique as follows.
In many, perhaps most, cases the existing state of doctrine allows
appellate judges to choose how to decide a case based on their
ideologically conditioned attitudes toward the events or
transactions before them. In so doing, judges have no lever and no
place to stand, and so they just make up their answers, not
randomly, but in patterns that can be accounted for by their sense
of, not some abstract notion of a neutralized "policy," but of what
are commonly thought of as "political" preferences of the kind
commonly associated with being a Democrat or a Republican.
Duncan asserts that the process of political decision making
happens often, but not necessarily, or even likely, always. He is
careful to make it clear that he believes that even in appellate
courts there are cases where all that is called for is application of
the obvious rule.
And, he regularly makes arguments in the following form: "It
may or may not be true that lawmaking through adjudication
buttresses the status quo in the way I have described. It seems
plausible to me, and worth working on, both at a theoretical and at
16 For publications that brought this reaction, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV. (1979); Duncan Kennedy,
Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal
Thought in America-1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3 (Steven
Spitzer ed., 1980); Duncan Kennedy, Utopian Rationalism in Legal Thought (1970)
(unpublished manuscript).
17 My colleague, Betty Mensch, reports the same reaction and, interestingly, to the
same works as in supra note 16.
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a practical level."18 Moreover, Duncan adopts a restrained view of
"the political." His is not an argument at the level of
"Liberalism"-a grand political theory that undergirds all
contemporary legal and political thought in an endless struggle to
suppress unarticulated communitarian alternatives-but rather at
the level of contemporary domestic politics-liberals and
conservatives in common parlance.
Thus, in form at least, Duncan's book is not designed to
outrage. The concepts and most of the examples should be
familiar to almost anyone reasonably well educated in law.
Further, the argument is comfortably situated within the
recognizable contours of American academic jurisprudence. The
very chasteness of the presentation flags the book as an example of
internal critique. Indeed, it is almost respectfully addressed to true
believers in the dominant faith, as if to say, "Pardon me, old chap,
but before you head out of the men's room you probably should
know that your fly is unzipped."
Contrast Peter Gabel's anything but well-known effort to
cover the same terrain, Reification in Legal Reasoning.19 It is a
truly great piece, intellectually challenging and psychologically
insightful. At the same time, however, one needs to recognize that
Peter writes from the perspective of existential Marxism flavored
with psychoanalysis. His argument is thus recondite and his prose
verges on the rebarbative. For several years I tried to teach
Peter's piece to first-year law students. However, in the end I gave
up since my students simply refused to read it, and I refused to try
the dirty, old trick of putting it on the exam. The real problem for
most of them was that nowhere did the piece connect with their
intellectual experience.
Peter begins his argument with the assertion that "[h]uman
relationships within contemporary capitalism are characterized by
a traumatic absence of connectedness that does not wish to
become conscious of itself."2  Humans deny their lack of
connectedness to each other because doing so is a condition for
maintaining what little connectedness actually exists with others.
Such connectedness comes from perceiving oneself in a social role
constituted by capitalism, a perception that is shared by others.
Each of these experiences of being in a role is also a perception of
oneself as "thing-like"-the essence of alienation-each of these
roles is thus properly seen as reified, that is, taken to be concrete
18 CRITIQUE, supra note 5, at 246.
19 Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND
SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16, at 25.
20 Id. at 28.
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when it is in fact contingent. At the same time the thing-like
quality of each of these reified roles is felt by humans to be
illegitimate, though denied to be such, and so there is always the
possibility that the collectivity may "explode the whole thing."21 In
this circumstance: "The function of 'the law' is to give each of us
the impression that the system operates according to normative
law."22 Therefore, "the law is a denial ... of our collective
experience of illegitimacy."23  Thus, the function of law is
legitimation.
A judge like all other humans in the capitalist system, is
"passivised within a role, fulfilling. . . 'the judicial function. '' 24 In
acting out this function, the judge begins with "a sense of the
whole culture.., that he passivizes into the movement of a quasi-
object, such that each discrete situation of facts reveals itself to his
mind against the background of the total 'factual' context from
which the law has emerged."25  In other words, the judge
apprehends the completely reified social structure characteristic of
capitalism, denying the made, changeable contingency of social
relations. This reified structure is understood as the normal
movement of the social field, both in the sense of "normal" as
"regular," and in the sense of "normatively compelling." In this
latter sense, the reified structure embodies the "presupposed
norm" that the judge thereafter will be called on to "apply."
From the judge's perspective, any legal dispute is a
"disequilibriation '' 26 or a breakdown in the system of normal social
relations that must be set right. The judge sets things right by
generating a conceptual analysis that embodies the presupposed
norm that inheres in the reified system of social relations. To
accomplish this task, the judge reifies "legitimating concepts"
drawn from the presupposed norm so that "it will appear that the
functioning of the system is simply the factual activity of the
legitimating concepts, thereby representing the system itself as
legitimate a priori. ' 27 This method affirms the status quo. Then,
the judge reverses the movement of thought so as to generate "a
process of re-experiencing the event itself as that event is signified
through legitimating concepts. ' 28 The point of this process is that
it is a way of continuing the denial of the illegitimacy and




25 Id. at 31.
26 Id. at 33.
27 Id. at 37.
28 Id. at 41.
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unconnectedness of social relations as they are experienced under
capitalism by depicting the unalienated group in its imaginary form
as a part of political theory.
Now, I am not foolish enough to assert that cls would have
had a more triumphal trajectory had we all embraced Peter's
construct for judicial decision making, for my guess is precisely the
opposite. Nor do I wish to suggest that Peter's construct is in some
way "better" than Duncan's. Indeed, casting an argument in prose
that is readily understandable for most lawyers makes Duncan's
construction obviously more plausible, if one's purpose is seeking
converts. Even less do I wish to suggest that Duncan's conception
is "pedestrian" while Peter's is "revolutionary." Indeed, when
Peter's conception is stripped of some of its Marxist and
psychoanalytic trappings, it somewhat resembles Karl Llewellyn's
explication of how a judge uses "situation sense" to identify a
"type-fact situation" in which an appropriate decisional rule is
"immanent."29 On the other hand, I do wish to suggest that Peter's
construct is incommensurable with Duncan's in the way that
differing paradigms are incommensurable.
Note first what disappears from Peter's world-rule and
discretion, strict and liberal construction, law and politics, neutral
principles, original intent. All of this is implicitly cast aside as
somehow irrelevant. In their place are other markers of potential
debate-alienation, roles, reification, presupposed norms,
equilibration. All of these concepts are similarly irrelevant to
Duncan's world. Yet some things are common to both worlds-
most obviously questions of the appropriateness of individual
norms in given factual situations. All three of these characteristics
are indicative of the fact that these two understandings of judicial
decision making are products of different paradigms for
understanding law, paradigms as different as those classic
examples of paradigms-Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy.
If paradigms shift as if by magic, as I have argued Kuhn
should have understood, and as I believe is implicit in the work of
Foucault, whose explication of differing epistimes studiously avoids
the very different work of explaining the transition between any
two, then there is a deficiency in Duncan's consistent strategy of
internal critique. Such deficiency is absent from Peter's
"otherwise" critique of judicial decision making. Given the basic
rule of argument that one never argues on an intelligent
opponent's turf, it ought to have been apparent to all of us in cls as
lawyers that the cost of working within an extant paradigm is the
29 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
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chance to shift a paradigm. To engage in internal critique is to
abandon the transformative potential of one's work, a potential
that might be set off against the real likelihood that any work
outside the existing paradigm will sink unnoticed, like a bad bet on
a "sure thing" in the fourth at Aqueduct.3"
Those not drawn to the futility of regularly tearing up pari-
mutual tickets representing bets on sure things, who instead decide
that internal critique is a more plausible approach to life and work,
may consider the history of cls, for that history demonstrates the
limits of such an approach. Slowly we lost momentum when, after
two good ideas-the indeterminacy thesis and the critique of
rights-we never came up with a third.31 I hold this eventuality
against no one, least of all Duncan. He kept trying out candidates
for that third idea,32 while I didn't have a clue.
However, looking back at our alternatives, I don't think that
we missed anything obvious. Within the paradigm of liberal
legalism, about all that was left was sustained work on the
decisional biases in American law. We began this work with
respect to law and economics; thereafter it was taken up by first
the Fem-Crits and then the Race-Crits. However, internal critique
could go only so far. We might work to increase our numbers and
attempt to protect our juniors, but without that next big
unassimilable idea we were going to end up as did American legal
realism, marginalized in the act of being included. We would then
become nothing more than one of the possible perspectives that
30 There is, of course, the possibility that by "chipping away" at a paradigm bit by bit
eventually there will come a time when the whole edifice will disintegrate. Laura Kalman
argues that this is what was done to Realism by the 1950s "neutral principles" crowd. And
it is just barely possible that Duncan believes that he is engaged in such a chipping away so
that in time the demise of the liberal legal order will follow. All I can say is that I do not
believe that this is how paradigm shifts take place. At least the one that I have observed-
the adoption of plate tectonics in geology-did not take place that way, nor do I think that
the adoption of relativity theory in physics proceeded in that way either.
31 Laura Kalman suggests that the notion that law was "relatively autonomous,"
neither directly tied to economic relations and the interests of the ruling class nor free of
the influence of those relations and interests, an idea dragged into law from Neo-
Marxism-was the third good idea and that cls floundered in its search for a fourth. She
may be right. However, while I see evidence of a continuing impact of indeterminacy and
the rights critique in legal scholarship narrowly conceived, I see no evidence of the
continuing impact of the notion of relative autonomy there. Indeed, the only surviving
traces of the concept seem to be in legal history, where it seems to me to have been co-
opted in the service of a traditional doctrinalist scholarship rather than to be standing as a
continuing critique of traditional practice, as is the case with the other good ideas.
32 For examples of this search, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983) [hereinafter
KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION]; DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. (1993);
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711 (1980).
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can be found in a law professor's kit bag, just another take on
current problems that must be dragged out when it becomes time
for any topic to be looked at from all sides-in the name of
fairness, of course-in the big tent that is the Association of
American Law Schools.
Contrast the course of law-and-society scholarship in the
years since 1978 when, in that first meeting in Madison, cls began
as a potentially broad grouping of empirical and critical scholars.
From the beginning reviled by hard-core cls partisans as
conservative and positivist, law-and-society work has become less
positivist and more left-wing in the past fifteen years. It remains a
modestly vibrant, unassimilable force in the law schools, a standing
challenge to traditional understandings of law.
Still, the law-and-society alternative to internal critique, much
less Peter's example of an "otherwise" world, offers no easy
promise of success. After all, transformations of intellectual life
are magic. I have no reason to believe that had Duncan and the
rest of us gone wholeheartedly down the road of external critique
some lucky person would have gotten the chance to yell,
"Paradigm Shift!" However, I do think that, from a missionary
perspective, we might have garnered a wider range of adherents
than we did by following our critique a bit further so as to reject
the paramount position of normative legal scholarship,33 and,
instead, focus on the daily practices of lawyers, the various routine
activities of law-trained individuals.
In focusing on the practices of lawyers, we might have begun
with the simple question, "What do lawyers do all day?" In
answering this question, we would have found that a few things
become apparent. First, only .a specialized few parse doctrine on a
regular basis and fewer still make appellate arguments. Thus, our
classes, and the thrust of our intellectual engagement, had better
focus on something else.
Second, looked at critically, a good deal of what lawyers do all
day, whether their practice is litigational or transactional, is
negotiate bureaucracy. Their stock-in-trade is understanding the
institutional imperatives of bureaucratic organizations. A
systematic theory covering a range of bureaucratic structures
would be a useful tool for graduates and the basis for a potent
critique of law.
33 This is, of course, the position for which Pierre Schlag has become well known, some
might say infamous. See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW (1996); PIERRE
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere
to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
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Third, looked at from a different perspective, another large
part of what lawyers do is formalize relationships between legal
actors, e.g., borrower/lender, acquirer/target. In doing this kind of
work, lawyers focus on understanding the foreground of specific
client concerns, the background of institutional structures, and the
often modest, quite general law that, like the mote, lies in the
middle distance. All three need to be unified in order to produce a
set of documents that get the client's job done. Simple theories
that would generalize the lawyer's job in this way would be of
great assistance to new associates, eliminating much of the
mystique associated with the laying on of legal hands, and lead
directly to quite serious questions of the value of and limits to the
services provided.34
All of these and similar questions about the practices of
lawyers are of serious interest to that great mass of law students
who are disaffected from the enterprise because "law school is not
about anything." It is just possible that they are also of interest to
a differently disaffected group of law professors as well. We might
have targeted these individuals rather than those sharing our
generalized left politics. After all, if we were going to be
marginalized anyway, we might as well have been marginalized
with more friends.
In this sense, I think that it was and remains a mistake for
Duncan and our crew to have followed Chairman Mao and placed
politics first, as well as to have. implicitly worked from the top
down. It was wonderful to find our theories validated when, as we
predicted, scholars, and even whole faculties, at fancy law schools
reacted with horror to what we said. Such a confirmation of
theory is heady stuff. But to the extent that the battle for the soul
of the law schools was going to be won, it was going to be won in
that great range of quite ordinary schools. As one also might have
predicted, faculty and students at these schools were not turned
from the Dark Side simply because faculty at fancy schools saw us
as representatives of the Dark Side-precisely the reverse. This
loss of potential adherents was unfortunate because our internal
34 This suggestion should not be construed as a plea for more clinical education. Most
of what passes for such in this country is an embarrassment. Clinical teaching is still
wedded to the ideas that doing good works will redeem the dross that is the classroom,
that theory is unnecessary to the practice of law, and that skills are context free. These are
silly notions. While Deweyian "learning by doing" is sensible, in both senses, the point of
Dewey's idea was that theory emerged out of practice. But one does not need "real
clients" so to derive theory. Indeed, for this purpose clients are a distraction. When done
in a rich context, the painstaking examination of a fifty-page merger agreement will do as
well or better as a basis for building theories about practices than thwarting an eviction, at




critique, of which this book of Duncan's is an excellent example,
was hardly revolutionary. Whatever one may think of janitors and
law professors regularly switching jobs, the real revolutionary idea
would be to assign law professors and law students to law schools
by lot!35 None of us has ever suggested that in print.36
35 See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE (1999).
36 Duncan, who suggested that janitors and law professors switch jobs in KENNEDY,
LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 32, reminds me that a proposal somewhat similar was
floated in that wonderful piece of ephemera, Lizard No.], published by AFAR, a group of
cls members, and distributed free at the AALS meeting that year: "Third, the schools
should abolish their own hierarchy, so as to create social justice for law teachers,
equalizing financial resources and randomly reassigning teachers (within narrow regional
preferences) until all the schools in a given area are comparable in wealth and at least
initial prestige." AFAR, LIZARD NO. 1 (1984). Of course, this is a long way from
ensuring that there would be no significant difference between the student body at
Harvard and that at Chapman.
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